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ABSTRACT 
 
The Basel Committee’s recent consultative document on the “Proposal to Ensure the 
Loss Absorbency of Regulatory Capital at the Point of Non Viability” sets out a 
proposal aimed at “enhancing the entry criteria of regulatory capital to ensure that all 
regulatory capital instruments issued by banks are capable of absorbing losses in the 
event that a bank is unable to support itself in the private market.” 
 
As well as demonstrating its support of the Basel Committee’s statement that a public 
sector injection of capital should not protect investors from absorbing the loss that they 
would have incurred (had the public sector not chosen to rescue the bank), this paper 
also highlights identified measures which have been put forward as means of rescuing 
failing banks – without taxpayer financing. Furthermore, it highlights why the controlled 
winding down procedure also constitutes a means whereby losses could still be 
absorbed in the event that a bank is unable to support itself in the private market. 
 
 
Key Words: capital; insolvency; financial crises; moral hazard; Basel III; Investor 
Compensation Schemes Directive; bail outs; equity; liquidity 
 CHAPTER FOUR 
Measures Aimed at Enhancing the Loss Absorbency of Regulatory Capital  
at the Point of Non Viability 
 
Prof Marianne Ojo 1 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Capital is very significant in its role since it serves to absorb risks and protect deposits. Given 
the imposition of an adequately stipulated minimum ratio, it could also facilitate the process 
of equalising competition between banks (rather than impeding their ability to compete). 
 
 
The Basel Committee’s recent consultative document on the “Proposal to Ensure the 
Loss Absorbency of Regulatory Capital at the Point of Non Viability” sets out a 
proposal aimed at “enhancing the entry criteria of regulatory capital to ensure that all 
regulatory capital instruments issued by banks are capable of absorbing losses in the 
event that a bank is unable to support itself in the private market.” 2 
 
Of particular interest are the Committee’s observations regarding the consequences 
of rescuing several distressed banks during the recent Financial Crisis, through the 
injection of funds (by the public sector) in the form of common equity and other forms 
of Tier One Capital. Two associated consequences are as follows: 3 
 
- Its effect of supporting not only depositors but also the investors in regulatory 
capital instruments – which consequently resulted in  
- The inability of Tier Two capital instruments (mainly subordinated debt), and in 
some cases, non-common Tier One instruments, to absorb losses incurred by 
certain large internationally active banks that would have failed - had the 
public sector not provided support.  
 
 
As a means of ensuring that instruments are accorded with the status of “regulatory 
capital” and also dealt with accordingly, a pre condition was stipulated by the Committee 
– such pre condition being that “such instruments are capable of bearing a loss.” 4 
 
As well as the affirmation of its opinion that “a public sector injection of capital (needed to 
avoid the failure of a bank) should not protect investors in regulatory capital instruments from 
 
1Email marianne@hotmail.com, North West University. Final version submitted to publisher April 
2016  
2 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document “Proposal to Ensure 
the Loss Absorbency of Regulatory Capital at the Point of Non Viability” August 2010 at page 
1 (page 7 of 20) < www.bis.org/publ/bcbs174.htm.> 
3 See ibid 
4 Of particular interest is the third option which was provided by the Committee as a means of ensuring 
this outcome (of ensuring that such instruments are capable of bearing a loss). This option is namely, 
the requirement that “all regulatory capital instruments include a mechanism in their terms and 
conditions that would ensure that they would accept a loss at the point of non viability.” See ibid. 
absorbing the loss that they would have incurred if the public sector had not chosen to 
rescue the bank”, the Basel Committee clearly indicated in the Consultative Document that 
all regulatory capital instruments must be capable of absorbing a loss at least in gone 
concern situations. 5 This requirement was prompted by the Basel Committee’s observations 
from the recent Financial Crisis – which revealed that many regulatory capital instruments do 
not always absorb losses in gone concern situations. In this respect it remarked that: 6 
 
“The numerous public sector injections of capital during the crisis, and other forms of public 
sector support have had the indirect consequence of ensuring that in many instances, capital 
instruments issued by banks that have been bailed out, have not taken any losses at all.” 
 
 
 
Owing to huge liquidity problems, it was just recently announced that the ailing mortgage 
lender (Hypo Real Estate) is to be granted € 40 billion to the already € 102 billion in state 
guarantees. This (most recent) grant will also facilitate the launch of a “bad bank” whereby its 
toxic assets can be disposed of (aim being to strengthen the remaining core bank). 7 
 
The case of Hypo Real Estate (HRE)  8 is considered within this respect, not because it is 
regarded as having not absorbed any losses (at all), but rather, because it is questionable 
whether the resulting burden imposed on taxpayers (arising from government funding), could 
have been mitigated to a greater extent. Even though rescue aid was granted by the Commission 
to Hypo Real Estate on the 2nd of October 2008 and further measures were also communicated 
by the German authorities on the 26th October 2009 (measures which included SOFFin 
guarantees of 8 and 10 billion Euros for HRE), 9 HRE was eventually nationalised. 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 The Basel Committee added that “if gone concern were to be defined as insolvency and liquidation, 
then all regulatory capital instruments would be loss absorbent on a gone concern basis and such loss 
absorbency would be achieved through the subordination of the capital instruments – with the result 
that any repayment in liquidation would only be received if all depositors and higher ranked creditors 
are first repaid in full.” It however defined „gone concern“ to include „situations in which the public 
sector provides support to distressed banks that would otherwise have failed. ibid at page 3 
6 ibid at page 3  
7
See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “40 Milliarden Euro mehr Staatsgarantien”(Hypo Real Estate: 40 billion 
Euros Worth of More Government Guarantees) 11th September 2010 < 
http://www.faz.net/s/RubD16E1F55D21144C4AE3F9DDF52B6E1D9/Doc~EB16F2C756D694B4CA07FA5F  
7EF8E7535~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html> See also Bild, “Staats-Garantien für Hypo Real Estate: Wieso 
kriegt die Pleite-Bank noch einmal Milliarden?” 11th September 2010 
<http://www.bild.de/BILD/politik/wirtschaft/2010/09/11/hypo-real-estate-wieso-kriegt/die-pleite-bank-ploetzlich-
noch-einmal-milliarden.html>  
8 See European Commission, “State Aid no NN 44/2008 – Germany Rescue aid for Hypo Real Estate” 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/ii/doc/NN-44-2008-WLWL-en-02.10.2008.pdf  
9 See European Commission “European Commission State aid no N 694/2009 – Germany Emergency 
Guarantees for Hypo Real Estate” paragraph 3  
10 “In January 2009, the German government had promulgated necessary measures aimed at facilitating 
the adoption of legislation which would enable it acquire a majority stake holding in 
Hypo.”<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5381WB20090409> “The squeeze out of minority 
shareholders – this being approved by a court in Munich in October 2009, paved the way for the German 
government’s rescue fund SOFFin to get 100% of the real estate lender.” See Reuters; “Hypo Real Estate is 
Nationalised with Squeeze Out” <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLD67573320091013> 
  
How Can the Desire to Facilitate Gone Concern Loss Absorbency of All 
Regulatory Capital Instruments (Including cases where there is public sector 
support) be Achieved? 
 
 
“Conversion/Write offs” 
 
Whereby debt instruments are transferred into “higher quality and common equity 
capital with better loss absorption characteristics – with the result that the institution’s 
ability to withstand further losses is consolidated.” 11 
 
- Debt regarded as bank capital should be converted to stock or written off in a crisis – 
hence compelling bond investors to bear some of the cost of future bail outs. 12  
- All regulatory capital instruments sold by banks should be capable of 
absorbing losses if the company is unable to fund itself – before taxpayers’ 
cash is plundered into rescuing a lender, so-called contingent capital should 
be converted into equity or written off. 13  
 
 
Controlled Winding Down Procedures 
 
In the case which involved Bradford and Bingley, the UK authorities decided to pursue a 
wind down procedure whereby the retail deposit book was to be sold while an orderly 
wind down of the remainder of the business was to be undertaken for the purposes of 
maximising recoveries – as well as minimising the burden on tax payers. 14 
 
Reasons for undertaking the route of a controlled winding down process – as opposed to 
uncontrolled insolvency were also highlighted. An orderly winding down process would not 
only “maximise the value of the remaining assets and minimise the amount of necessary 
state aid”, but would also facilitate the repayment of the working capital facility as well as 
statutory debt. Furthermore, the reasons for the choice of a controlled winding down process 
necessitated a consideration of the legislation in force when the decision to wind down 
Bradford and Bingley (and thereafter, Rumpco) was taken – and such reasons include: 15 
 
- An absence of a “strictly defined time-frame” for large and complex 
liquidations such as that of Bradford and Bingley (B & B).  
- The fact that B & B would not have obtained the working capital facility which 
was required in order to pay Rumpco creditors – had B & B chosen the route 
of uncontrolled insolvency. An uncontrolled insolvency procedure would also 
have resulted in a liquidation shortfall with respect to debt owed to creditors.  
 
11 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document “Proposal to Ensure the 
Loss Absorbency of Regulatory Capital at the Point of Non Viability” August 2010 at page 13 (page 19 
of 20) < http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs174.pdf?noframes=1>  
12 “Basel Committee Says Bank Bond Investors Should Help Fund Future Bailouts” < 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-19/basel-committee-says-bank-bond-investors-should-
help-bear- cost-of-bailouts.html> 
13 ibid  
14 See European Commission, “State Aid N194/2009 – United Kingdom : Liquidation Aid to Bradford 
and Bingley Plc” at paragraph 4 page 2  
15ibid at paragraphs 13 and 14  
- An uncontrolled insolvency procedure would have endangered the prospects 
of the recovery of full value of statutory debt.  
- Rumpco’s uncontrolled insolvency would have undermined financial stability – 
as well as market confidence.  
 
 
 
Definition of Different Classes of Capital – should there be a re-definition of 
what constitutes regulatory capital – since it has been proposed that all 
regulatory instruments should be convertible/capable of absorbing losses?  
 
Capital is considered to comprise of elements of Tier One, Two and Three capital. 
Tier One Capital comprises common equity – which has the following attributes:  16 
 
- It is considered to be the highest quality component of capital  
- It is subordinated to all other elements of funding – absorbing losses as and 
when they occur, having full flexibility of dividend payments  
- No maturity date  
- It is the primary form of funding which helps to ensure that banks remain solvent.  
 
 
 
 
The distinction between definitions of Tier One and Tier Two capital are highlighted by 
the Committee as corresponding to capital which absorbs losses on a going concern 
basis and capital which absorbs losses on a gone concern basis respectively. 17 
 
Proposed key changes, whilst aimed at “significantly improving the quality and 
consistency of the common equity of Tier One capital”, as well as simplifying Tier 
Two Capital (to the extent that there would be only one set of entry criteria – and the 
removal of sub categories pertaining to Tier Two) also include the recommendation 
that Tier Three capital be abolished “to ensure that market risks are met with the 
same quality of capital as credit and operational risks.” 18 
 
 
As a result, the proposed harmonised structure of capital will consist of Tier One 
Capital (going concern capital) with further components comprising common equity 
and additional going concern capital and; Tier Two Capital (gone concern capital). 19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document “Strengthening the Resilience 
of the Banking Sector” December 2009 at page 14  
17 ibid  
18 ibid at page 14-16  
19 ibid at page 17  
  
In proposing a new definition of capital, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, in its Consultative Document, 20 elaborated on “certain overarching 
objectives” which had contributed towards its formulation of the proposed new 
definition of capital and these are as follows: 
 
- a) Tier One Capital must help a bank to remain a going concern  
- b) Regulatory adjustments must be applied to the appropriate component of capital   
- c) Regulatory capital must be simple and harmonised across jurisdictions  
- d) The components of regulatory capital must be clearly disclosed  
 
 
The proposed new definition of capital offers several advantages – one of which is 
namely, the facilitation of harmonisation – since the regulatory definition of capital 
varies according to the jurisdiction and its governing law. 21 
 
D. Problems and Benefits Identified with Basel Committee’s Loss Absorbency 
Proposal 
 
Some problems identified with the Basel Committee’s proposal - that all regulatory 
instruments should be capable of absorbing losses include the following: 
 
- the need for a liquid market (which is considered not to exist at present)  
- A possible rise in the banks’ cost of capital (since investors are likely to demand 
compensation for the increased risk being borne – for which they will not be repaid. 22  
- Lower levels of investment  
- Increased uncertainty and further elevated levels of instability as a result of 
lower levels of investment  
 
Even though the above-mentioned issues have been raised, the Basel Committee is clearly 
justified in its affirmation that “a public sector injection of capital (needed to avoid the failure 
of a bank) should not protect investors in regulatory capital instruments from absorbing the 
loss that they would have incurred if the public sector had not chosen to rescue the bank.” 
 
Furthermore, most of these concerns are not entirely well-grounded since investment (in any 
case – and regardless of the recommendation that all regulatory capital instruments issued by 
banks are capable of absorbing losses on a going and gone concern basis) will always involve an 
element of risk. Banks should not be made to pay more money to investors for regulatory capital 
(if and when investors demand compensation for increased risk for which they will not be repaid) 
since investors get paid to take risks and should expect risks with investments. Perhaps some 
form of reward or loyalty payments could be tied in to the investments – such 
 
20 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document “Strengthening the Resilience 
of the Banking Sector” December 2009 at pages 14 and 15 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs164.pdf>  
21 The regulatory definition of capital is considered to be “inevitably embedded in company law”. See 
European Banking Federation, Comments on Consultative Documents issued by Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision “Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector” and “International Framework for 
Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring” at page 13  
22 “Basel Committee Says Bank Bond Investors Should Help Fund Future Bailouts”   
< http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-19/basel-committee-says-bank-bond-investors-should-
help-bear- cost-of-bailouts.html> 
rewards being redeemed 23 by investors only in the event that the bank or firm operates 
on a gone concern basis. Other schemes which serve to ensure that minimum 
safeguards are place to compensate investors, to insure investor protection - as well as 
encourage small investors to invest in securities, include the Investor Compensation 
Schemes Directive (the ICD)  24 and Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive. 25 The ICD 
(which has been replaced by the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive – MiFID), 
“provides for clients receiving investment services from investment firms (including credit 
institutions) to be compensated in specific circumstances where the firm is unable to 
return money or financial instruments that it holds on the client’s behalf.” 26 
 
 
It is acknowledged that the Committee’s recommendations should signal to investors that 
higher risks are to be anticipated. Furthermore, bond holders (and not tax payers) should 
now expect to be the first resort (in terms of funding and new equity) where it is evident 
that an institution is likely to operate on a gone concern basis. This could result in slightly 
lower levels of investment – however, it could also produce the beneficial result of 
discouraging investment by those investors who take excessive risks – hence reducing 
moral hazard. A balance should be struck between introducing appropriate incentives 
(aimed at sustaining healthy levels of investment) which would encourage non reckless 
investors to invest and the need to discourage excessive levels of risk taking. 
 
 
Based on the Basel Committee’s efforts to improve the disclosure requirements of the 
components of regulatory capital, greater transparency should be facilitated – such transparency 
contributing to less uncertainty and assisting investors in deciding whether or not to invest in 
certain products. Bank depositors have greater need of protection since more rules (range of 
conduct rules) 27 exist within the investment sector - which serve the purpose of assisting 
investors in arriving at their investment decisions. In so far as the Basel Committee is able to 
achieve efforts aimed at mitigating substantial elements of uncertainty which may 
 
23 The European Banking Federation (EBF) made a proposal that instruments should not qualify (or be 
included) as Tier 2 capital if there would be incentives to redeem. European Banking Federation, Comments 
on consultative documents issued by Basel Committee on Banking Supervision “Strengthening the 
Resilience of the Banking Sector” and “International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards 
and Monitoring” at page 13   
24 The Directive 97/9/EC on Investor Compensation Schemes, known as the Investment Compensation 
Scheme Directive (the ICD), was adopted in 1997 as a supplement for the Investment Services Directive 
(Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field (OJ L 
141,11.6.1993, p. 27– 46).   
25 Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit-guarantee   
schemes [amended by Directive 2005/1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 
2005 and Directive 2009/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 
amending Directive 94/19/EC on deposit-guarantee schemes as regards the coverage level and the 
payout delay (Text with EEA relevance)]  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31994L0019:EN:HTML  
26 See Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending 
Directive 97/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on investor compensation schemes at page 
2 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0371:FIN:EN:PDF> 
 
27 As well as serving as an “additional layer of protection in collaboration with conduct of business 
rules, prudential regulation and operational safeguards, the Investor Compensation Schemes Directive 
(ICD) is also aimed at “protecting investors against the risk of losses in the event of an investment 
firm’s inability to repay money or return assets held on their behalf.” See DG Internal Market and 
Services, EVALUATION OF THE INVESTMENT COMPENSATION SCHEME DIRECTIVE DG 
INTERNAL MARKET AND SERVICES EXECUTIVE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS at page 2 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/internal_market/docs/evaluation/inv-comp-schem-directive_en.pdf  
exist – with respect to the implementation of new regulations, such efforts should 
eliminate the fears attributed to consequences of uncertainty – namely, greater 
volatility in the bank bond market. 
 
 
Benefits of the Basel Committee’s Proposals 
 
- Discouraging excessive risk taking (since investors will not be encouraged to 
buy securities under the assumption that they will avoid losses in the event of 
a bank failure)  
- It would reduce the need for government bailouts owing to the requirement 
that contingent capital be converted (to equity or written off) to fund rescues 
rather than taxpayers solely bearing the cost. Hence bond investors of a bank 
will serve as the first resort during the impending collapse of a bank.  
 
 
 
Measures Identified by the AFME as Means of Rescuing Failing Banks Without 
Taxpayer Financing.  
 
In its paper “The Systemic Safety Net: Pulling Failing Firms Back From the Edge”, the 
Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME) shed some light on two mechanisms 
which are considered to be instrumental in the achievement of the goal of managing a failing 
financial institution – as well as the re capitalisation of such an institution (without the need 
for capital support from governments and tax payers). 28 These mechanisms are: 29 
 
- 1) The Bail In Mechanism : Whose implementation commences when a firm 
reaches a pre-defined trigger – which would re-capitalise a firm as a going 
concern (through the conversion of selected levels of unsecured debt to 
common equity). Since no shareholder or creditor consultation is considered to 
be necessary, a swift implementation of its operation is expected.  
 
- 2) Contingent Capital: Whose implementation has been undertaken historically by the 
insurance sector and which serves as a provision for one-time losses. It is issued in 
the form of notes which are convertible into equity as soon as a pre-defined trigger is 
attained by the issuer. Since it requires no regulatory involvement, transparency is 
enhanced – such transparency serving as a potential means in helping to prevent 
localised problems from triggering into a full blown systemic crisis.”  
 
One difference between both mechanisms can be attributed to the frequency of their 
applicability. Whilst contingent capital serves as a provision for one-time losses which 
are unexpected, the bail in mechanism operates according to an expected pre-
determined threshold level. 
 
According to the AFME, either of these options would serve as a better alternative 
than liquidation. 30 
 
28 Association for Financial Markets in Europe, “AFME Outlines Ways To Rescue Failing Banks Without 
Tax Payer Financing”  http://www.afme.eu/AFME/Home/sifi%20pr.pdf at page 1 of 2  
29 ibid  
30 Furthermore, the AFME adds that with each option, the bank’s shareholders would bear the loss 
through devaluation or dilution of their equity and that (more critically), neither option requires capital 
support from tax payers or a pre capitalised fund for providing liquidity. See ibid.  
  
Basel Committee’s Measures Aimed At Improving the Quality of Tier One Capital  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: “Improving the Quality of Tier One Capital” 31 
 
„The enhanced Basel II framework (which includes reforms aimed at increasing the 
quantity of capital – as well as improving the quality of capital),and the 
macroprudential overlay are (together) referred to as Basel III. „ 32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for International Settlements 
Publications, page 11 of 26 < http://www.bis .org/speeches/sp100303.pdf>see also page 9 of 26;ibid. „With 
hindsight, it is acknowledged that the global banking system entered the crisis with an insufficient level of capital 
and not enough high-quality capital. Recall that regulated financial institutions are required to hold Tier 1 and Tier 
2 capital equal to 8% of risk-weighted assets, with Tier 1 capital representing at least half this amount. 
Unfortunately the definition of what constituted capital included instruments or accounting items that could not 
absorb losses on a going-concern basis. Market participants knew this, and increasingly focused on the levels of 
tangible common equity in banks’ capital structures (after deduction of intangible assets such as goodwill). The 
levels of core Tier 1 equity proved to be too low.“ See page 10 of 26;ibid.  
32Ibid at page 9 of 26 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
According to Laeven and Majnoni, 33 regulatory capital, “should cope with the occurrence 
of unexpected losses – that is, losses that are large but infrequent and further, loan loss 
reserves should, instead ,cope with expected losses.” In reconciling the different views 
held about bank capital requirements, they propose a partitioning of regulatory capital 
which is based not only on terms relating to priority (as is the case for Tier One and Tier 
Two Capital), but also (and foremost) on risk management considerations. 34 The 
management of “Too Big to Fail Firms” should be sent appropriate signals – signals 
which would highlight the fact that the importance of such firms (to systemic stability) 
does not provide justification for the management of such firms to act recklessly. 
Intensive restructuring, to the extent that the entire management of such a firm is 
replaced (with new management) serves as an example of such a warning. This would 
also facilitate the reduction of moral hazard and excessive levels of risk taking. 
 
 
Distinguishing between Expected and Unexpected Losses: Regulatory Capital and 
Unexpected Losses v Loan Loss Reserves and Expected Losses 
 
Should Tier One Capital alone cover potential losses – particularly in view of the 
Basel Committee’s recent recommendation which is aimed at ensuring that all 
regulatory instruments absorb losses? Which component should (have) or be 
endowed with greater capacity to absorb expected or unexpected losses? 35 
 
With respect to the current debate on loss loan provisioning, the European Banking 
Federation (EBF), the EBF is supportive of the provisioning based on Expected Loss 
model and recommended a provisioning model based on the EL concept, which 
“captures the economic reality of the lending activities of financial institutions in line 
with the six principles of the Bank for International Settlements” in order to achieve 
sound Expected Loss provisioning approach. 36 
 
 
 
 
 
33 See L Laeven and G Majnoni, „Loan Loss Provisioning and Economic Slowdowns: Too Much, Too 
Late? at page 6  
34 ibid   
35 The preference for total regulatory capital – owing to its effectiveness in capturing potential losses, 
was highlighted by the Federcasse – in reference to the proposal of a consideration of only Tier One 
capital to cover buffers. See Federazione Italiana delle Banche di Credito Cooperativo Casse Rurali 
ed Artigiane,(Federcasse) Comments on consultative documents issued by Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision “Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector” and “International 
Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring” 
  
 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs165/ifoccb.pdf at page 10 
  
36 European Banking Federation, Comments on consultative documents issued by Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision “Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector” and “International Framework 
for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring” at page 6  
 
http://www.finansraadet.dk/media/208544/ebf_hoeringssvar_international_framework_for_liquidity_risk_measu 
rement_standards_and_monitoring_150410.pdf 
 
Two principal reasons have been put forward by the European Banking Federation to justify 
their proposal of a sufficient level of non-predominant Tier One when limits to the capital 
components are determined. 37 These are attributed to “the quality of non-core instruments 
which will increase significantly compared to today’s instruments; and the fact that institutions 
will need to increase their global own funds level to comply with the new rules. 
page12 “ 38 
 
Should the minimum capital ratio of 8% be revised? 
 
For reasons associated with the desire to enhance the competitive ability of banks, 
an increase in the present capital ratio is not favoured. 
 
Tier Two capital should be able to cover losses absorbed at the point of non viability 
– however, restrictions should be imposed on such potential – in contrast to the case 
with Tier One capital. There should be less restrictions on the classes of debt like 
instruments which can be included under Tier One capital. 
 
Furthermore, those shares which are to be redeemed (as incentives) in the event of 
the firm operating as a gone concern (and which should also absorb losses – hence 
resulting in a reduction of their values when and if they are redeemed) should be 
included as Tier One capital. As illustrated, Basel III reforms reflect efforts being 
made within this field – particularly with respect to contingent convertible bonds 
(which are currently being reviewed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 European Banking Federation, Comments on consultative documents issued by Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision “Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector” and “International Framework for Liquidity Risk 
Measurement, Standards and Monitoring” at page 13 
http://www.finansraadet.dk/media/208544/ebf_hoeringssvar_international_framework_for_liquidity_risk_measu 
rement_standards_and_monitoring_150410.pdf   
38 Other benefits attributed to the non-core Tier 1 instruments include its large investor base and the very 
useful currency diversification. For this reason, a request was put (by the European Banking Federation) 
to the Committee to set Core Tier 1 at a reasonable level - close to 51%.;ibid  
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